KAMPALA, Uganda — Uganda’s controversial digital number plate project is facing a deeper test than whether it can track vehicles. A parliamentary investigation is now confronting questions about the technology’s effectiveness, the cost to motorists, procurement decisions and whether the government obtained value for public resources.
The debate intensified after former Works and Transport Minister Gen Edward Katumba Wamala and former Internal Affairs Minister Maj Gen Kahinda Otafiire offered sharply contrasting assessments of the Intelligent Transport Monitoring System (ITMS), which underpins the digital number plate programme.
Appearing before Parliament’s Committee on Physical Infrastructure on October 13, Gen Katumba defended the project as a security intervention designed to help police investigate crime. Otafiire, however, questioned whether the system delivered the capabilities promised to the government, describing its value as limited.
Their disagreement comes as lawmakers examine the project’s reported US$25 million cost, the legal and financial arrangements behind the contract, and concerns over whether the technology was adequately assessed before implementation.
The central question is no longer simply whether the system works. It is whether Uganda acquired the right technology, through a defensible process, at a justifiable cost.
A security system with competing assessments
Gen Katumba told MPs that the project originated from President Yoweri Museveni’s directive to establish an integrated vehicle-monitoring system to support national security and police investigations.
He said the initiative involved several government institutions, including police, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, the Ministry of Finance and the Solicitor General. The arrangements, he added, envisaged technology transfer and eventual involvement of the National Enterprise Corporation.
Gen Katumba also cited personal experience to explain why he considered surveillance technology valuable. He told the committee that police had used tracking and surveillance capabilities to trace people involved in a 2021 gun attack against him, enabling the suspects to face court proceedings.
However, he acknowledged that he could not establish whether the system that helped investigators in his case was directly connected to improvements subsequently introduced under the ITMS project.
That distinction is important. Evidence that police surveillance can help solve crimes does not automatically establish that every component of a new technology programme is effective or that the programme represents value for money.
Otafiire drew precisely that distinction.
The former Internal Affairs minister said the existing police CCTV network and the ITMS were separate systems and should not be treated as interchangeable. He questioned the new system’s technical capabilities, compatibility with existing infrastructure and overall contribution to police operations.
According to his testimony, concerns had emerged during the project’s earlier implementation, including the installation of only two computers at the police monitoring centre in Naguru.
He also described an experiment in which the number plates were removed from a vehicle while the plates themselves were taken elsewhere. The system, he said, continued to indicate that the vehicle remained at its original location.
His account raises a fundamental technical question: does the system reliably locate the vehicle itself, or can its tracking function be compromised when the relevant device or identification mechanism is removed?
That claim requires independent technical verification. But it is precisely the kind of question a parliamentary inquiry should resolve through controlled testing rather than competing political accounts.
Police recovery figures offer evidence, but not the whole answer
The strongest evidence in favour of the system came from police figures presented to Parliament.
On September 30, Police Director of ICT AIGP Felix Baryamwisaki told MPs that 337 of 375 reported stolen vehicles had been tracked and recovered, representing a recovery rate of approximately 90 per cent.
The figures suggest that vehicle-tracking capabilities can provide practical security benefits.
Two days later, members of the Physical Infrastructure Committee visited the police monitoring centre in Naguru and witnessed a demonstration of the system. Committee chairperson Mwine Mpaka subsequently confirmed that cars and motorcycles could be tracked.
The demonstration was significant because it moved the debate beyond theoretical claims and allowed lawmakers to observe the technology in operation.
But neither a successful demonstration nor a reported recovery rate resolves every question surrounding the project.
Parliament must establish how the 375 cases were selected, whether the recoveries can be independently verified, what role the digital number plates played in each case, and whether the outcomes could have been achieved through existing tracking and surveillance systems.
It should also determine how the system performs when plates or tracking devices are removed, vehicles travel through areas with limited network coverage, or identification equipment fails.
The distinction is between demonstrating that a technology can work under particular conditions and establishing that it performs reliably across the range of circumstances for which it was purchased.
A 90 per cent recovery rate, if independently verified and properly attributed to the system, would be an important achievement. It would not, on its own, prove that the procurement was sound or that the project’s price was justified.
The missing feasibility study raises bigger questions
Perhaps the most consequential issue emerging from the inquiry is the reported absence of a preliminary feasibility study.
According to reporting by Daily Monitor, Katumba acknowledged before the committee that the Ministry of Works and Transport had not conducted a preliminary feasibility study before rolling out the digital number plate project.
A feasibility study should ordinarily establish the problem a proposed system is intended to solve, assess alternative technologies, identify implementation risks, estimate costs and determine whether the anticipated benefits justify the investment.
For a nationwide vehicle-monitoring programme, this process should also examine compatibility with existing CCTV infrastructure, maintenance requirements, cybersecurity, data storage, local technical capacity and the long-term cost of replacing equipment.
Without a documented assessment, it becomes harder to establish why a particular technology was selected over alternatives or whether the government negotiated the most appropriate arrangement.
Otafiire told MPs that he had raised concerns about the compatibility of the imported technology with the Chinese equipment used in Uganda’s existing surveillance network. He said he had consulted police, technical experts at Makerere University and regional counterparts who, according to his account, had expressed reservations.
He also questioned the reliability and origin of equipment assembled from components supplied by different manufacturers.
These are allegations and recollections presented during a parliamentary inquiry, not final findings of wrongdoing. They nevertheless make the case for examining the technical assessments, procurement records and internal advice that informed the government’s decision.
If warnings were raised before implementation, the committee should establish who received them, how they were evaluated and why the project proceeded.
If the warnings were technically unfounded, the government should produce the evidence demonstrating that. If they were valid, Parliament should establish why corrective action was not taken before substantial resources were committed.
Who determined the price?
The financial arrangements present another major test of accountability.
The ITMS has been reported to cost US$25 million, but lawmakers have also questioned a financial model of US$257 million against a contractor’s reported feasibility estimate of US$123 million. That creates a US$134 million discrepancy between the two estimates, although the figures may relate to different cost bases or project assumptions and must be reconciled before being treated as directly comparable.
The committee is seeking explanations for how the project’s financial requirements were determined, whether appropriate due diligence was conducted and whether the relevant legal approvals were obtained.
It has also questioned the arrangements under which motorists pay the contractor or its subsidiary for digital number plates rather than making the payments directly into government revenue accounts.
These issues require documentary answers.
The government should disclose, subject to legitimate security protections, the contract’s financial structure, the services included in the price, the basis for the charges, the responsibilities assigned to the contractor and the mechanisms for auditing payments.
Security considerations may justify protecting sensitive operational information. They should not automatically prevent scrutiny of the public financial commitments, procurement procedures and charges imposed on citizens.
A security project is not exempt from the basic requirement that public authorities demonstrate why the expenditure was necessary and how the money is being accounted for.
Motorists are paying for a system they did not design
The controversy has a direct cost-of-living dimension.
New digital number plate packages have been priced at Shs714,300, a charge that has attracted criticism from lawmakers and vehicle-sector representatives.
The cost is especially significant for motorcycle riders, small traders and other motorists operating on limited incomes. A mandatory charge can become a substantial financial burden when it is imposed without a clear explanation of how the price was calculated or why the same package of services should attract particular charges across different vehicle categories.
Parliament has questioned the pricing model and the affordability of the plates. Traders have also raised concerns about supply delays and their effects on businesses.
The government must explain the relationship between the fee, the manufacturing and installation costs, the tracking technology, maintenance and other services included in the package.
It should also clarify whether the charge includes the cost of replacing components, what happens when embedded tracking batteries reach the end of their useful life, and whether motorists face additional fees over the system’s operational lifetime.
Daily Monitor reported that lawmakers questioned the tracking devices’ stated five-year battery life. If replacement costs eventually fall on vehicle owners, the total financial burden could extend well beyond the initial fee.
Affordability should therefore be assessed over the full lifecycle of the technology, not simply by comparing the upfront cost with the price of conventional number plates.
If the government considers the system essential for public safety, it must also explain how the cost is distributed fairly and whether lower-cost alternatives could achieve comparable security benefits.
Local manufacturing and technology transfer
Otafiire also questioned why the government moved away from established local number plate supplier GM Tumpeco, associated with businessman Gordon Wavamunno, in favour of the imported arrangement.
His criticism raises a wider industrial policy question: how should Uganda balance the need for advanced technology with the potential benefits of domestic manufacturing, employment and technical skills development?
The government’s stated ambition included technology transfer and eventual involvement of the National Enterprise Corporation. Such commitments should be measured against concrete outcomes.
Parliament should establish how much equipment is manufactured locally, what skills have been transferred, how many Ugandan workers have been trained and whether local institutions can maintain or repair the system without excessive dependence on foreign suppliers.
However, local production should not automatically be treated as superior. The relevant test is whether domestic suppliers can meet the required technical, security and quality standards at a competitive cost.
A transparent comparison of local and imported alternatives would help establish whether the chosen arrangement serves Uganda’s long-term interests.
If local companies were capable of delivering an equivalent product, the government should explain why they were not selected. If they could not meet the requirements, officials should provide the technical and commercial evidence supporting that conclusion.
The CCTV controversy reinforces the need for oversight
The ITMS investigation comes against a broader background of scrutiny over Uganda’s public security technology and infrastructure maintenance.
In May 2026, President Museveni ordered senior officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and police to step aside while investigations proceeded into allegations of bribery and extortion linked to Shs31.37 billion in CCTV maintenance payments.
The allegations concerned the national CCTV and command-centre project, which is distinct from the digital number plate programme. They should not be conflated, and the allegations do not establish wrongdoing in the ITMS contract.
Nevertheless, the controversy illustrates why major security technology projects need robust procurement controls, transparent maintenance arrangements and effective independent oversight.
Technology can only deliver sustained public value when the institutions responsible for operating it have the necessary skills, budgets and accountability mechanisms.
A system that works during a demonstration but cannot be maintained, repaired or upgraded efficiently may become an expensive liability. Likewise, a technically sound system can lose public legitimacy if its procurement and financial arrangements are opaque.
Uganda must therefore examine not only whether the ITMS works today, but also whether the country can operate it reliably and affordably over time.
What Parliament must establish
The Physical Infrastructure Committee has an opportunity to move the debate beyond the competing accounts of former ministers and produce findings that can guide future public investment.
Its final report should establish the project’s full cost, reconcile the competing financial estimates and determine whether the required feasibility assessments and procurement approvals were completed.
It should commission or obtain an independent technical assessment of the tracking technology, including its performance when number plates or tracking devices are removed, its compatibility with existing infrastructure and the security of the data it collects.
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The committee should also verify police recovery figures, determine the extent to which the ITMS contributed to those outcomes and compare its performance with alternative systems.
Finally, it should assess the financial burden on motorists, the sustainability of maintenance arrangements and the extent to which the promised technology transfer and local participation have materialised.
Where evidence points to administrative failures or unlawful conduct, the committee should identify the responsible institutions and recommend appropriate action. Where the project delivers demonstrable benefits, those benefits should be quantified rather than dismissed because the programme is controversial.
The objective should be accountability, not a predetermined verdict.
The verdict should be based on evidence, not personalities
Katumba’s defence and Otafiire’s criticism illustrate why the ITMS debate cannot be settled by political testimony alone.
Katumba has pointed to the practical value of vehicle tracking in security investigations. Otafiire has challenged the project’s technical design, compatibility and contribution to existing surveillance capabilities. Both accounts deserve scrutiny, but neither replaces an independent assessment of the system’s performance and cost.
The police recovery figures and parliamentary demonstration suggest that tracking functions are available. The outstanding questions concern their reliability, the extent of their contribution to crime prevention and recovery, and whether the public benefits justify the investment and charges imposed on motorists.
Uganda needs effective technology to fight crime, recover stolen vehicles and improve road safety. But national security cannot become a blanket justification for weak feasibility assessments, unexplained costs or inadequate public oversight.
The government must demonstrate that the system was selected for sound technical and financial reasons, that its performance meets the objectives for which it was acquired, and that its costs are proportionate to the benefits it delivers.
The real test of the digital number plate project is not whether it can track a vehicle. It is whether Uganda can prove that the system is effective, affordable, lawfully procured and worth the public resources committed to it.
